Q1-2026 Portfolio Update : +5%

My summary of the first quarter 2026

I rarely do this, but a few investors that I follow do and I love reading their good and bad moves as well as their lessons learned during the quarter. I will take part in the game and write a summary of my quarter including the positions that I have in my portfolio or that I have sold.

This will not be the complete list of my portfolio, as several investment ideas are still in buy mode or I am waiting for a catalyst to buy. My text will consist of a summary of some positions, with some retrospectives of positive or negative choices.

The first quarter went rather well, with a performance of +5% in Canadian dollars. My benchmark is the SP500 converted into CAD. The reason you can see SP500 at only -2.3% is that the Canadian dollar has lost value against the USD.

During Q1, I faced a very large turnover due to several special situations that ended and stocks that rose too high and gave me an exit opportunity. I finished the first quarter with ~18% in cash. For the moment, I haven’t found good opportunity to reallocate this cash yet, but it should not be long.

The performance has been adjusted to remove 1.75% of fees (per year).

I have never used leverage, I think to start leveraging in the next 12 months if it is necessary to gain a few more alpha points.

---

Top 3 Books

Here are the top 3 books that I read during the year or that I reread in relation to the events of the quarter, or that helped me make better decisions. I will use this section to choose books that summarize the last 3 months well.

Short Selling: Strategies, Risks, and Rewards

The Canadian and U.S. stock markets have looked overvalued to me since 2025, and that conviction only strengthened this quarter. When you believe broad indices are expensive, you need a structured framework to act on it not just gut feelings and random puts. It gave me the confidence and the tools to scale my short allocation from 5% to up to 25% of the portfolio this quarter. In a market where I struggle to find cheap longs.

Think Again: The Power of Knowing What You Don’t Know

The single most important skill this quarter was the ability to change my mind quickly. I exited ALUULA after a massive run-up despite it being one of my favorite companies. I sold Fab-Form after management made a capital allocation decision I disagreed with. I liquidated Kneat after reassessing the Veeva competitive threat, even though I genuinely love the business. Adam Grant : “the best thinkers treat their own opinions as hypotheses, not identities.” In a market that moves fast and punishes stubbornness, the ability to kill your darlings to update, reverse, and re-enter without ego is what separates good returns from painful drawdowns.

Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction

With the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Q1 was dominated by geopolitical uncertainty that directly impacted energy prices, shipping costs, and macro positioning. In that environment, the ability to make disciplined probabilistic estimates and update them rapidly as new information arrives becomes critical. Tetlock framework is built on exactly this: breaking complex questions into smaller components, assigning granular probabilities, using base rates, and resisting the temptation to anchor on a single scenario. I applied this thinking directly to my Cordoba Minerals arbitrage, where I bought, sold when regulatory risk spiked, and re-entered after the buyer waived the approval clause each step was an explicit probability update, not a binary gamble. When the world gives you a Strait of Hormuz crisis, you need a system for thinking clearly under uncertainty.

---

Position Update

My portfolio covers several investment styles: nano/micro/small/mid-caps, high quality, high growth stock, deep-value and special situations (arbitrage, liquidations). The order of presentation is irrelevant—the first titles mentioned are not necessarily my biggest positions. To summarize my philosophy in one sentence: Skeptical Optimist - Value, Special Situations & Opportunistic Investing.

With several types of investment, you would think that I spread myself a little too much over too many different styles that surely require too much of my time. You would surely be right to think so. For now, I haven’t found a particular style that I prefer. My criterion is always to compare (risk adjust) old and new ideas to have the best possible return in the portfolio. I would like to focus only on micro-cap value/growth, but with the restrictions that limit me to invest too much in pink-sheets (OTCK), it limits my investments and I can’t find enough good ideas to have a 100% micro-cap value/growth portfolio. The current market, which seems extremely expensive to me, does not contribute. This is one of the reasons why I have several special situations in my portfolio.

$IRO.V - Inter-Rock Minerals Inc.

I have nothing new to say since I wrote about the company in April 2025. Some buybacks for 12 months and a 3rd investment in Embion. Their participation in Embion represents less than 5% of Embion capital. This could become a big catalyst, but only in several years. The price of milk has low for 12 months, but the price of their input is cheaper than in the past. Earnings should come out next week.

$PVF.A (Warrants) - Partners Value Investments L.P.

As you can see in the picture, we can quickly see that there is an opportunity. The Warrants allow us to exchange them for shares of the “inc” $PVF.A. Subsequently, we can exchange them for shares negotiable $PVF.UN. And if you have read correctly, we can buy and exchange Preferred Share PVF.PR.U (USD) as a method of payment. We can buy them between $22-24, very illiquid but we have had good opportunities for some months.

PW.PR.A, 7.75% Series A - PW 0.00%↑ Power REIT

Deep-value investment type on Power REIT Preferred Share. This was a mini position because it took me several months to buy only 1%, the stock is very illiquid but offered good risk/reward. Purchased between $3-4, these cumulative preferred share bring about $6.30 in accumulated unpaid dividends (11+ quarters), bringing the total liquidation value to ~$31/share.

The market therefore prices them at a 85-90% discount on their legal claim. The central catalyst is the forced alignment of interests: the management only holds ordinary shares, and dividends on the common cannot resume until the preferred ones are updated. After the sale of the greenhouses (in progress), a tender offer in the range $7-9 would be rational for the Trust. It would extinguish the cumulative bond at ~25-30 cents on the dollar and clear the path to an ordinary dividend. The right of preference holders to elect two additional trust companies after six quarters of non-payment (call-up threshold at only 10% of shares) creates increasing governance pressure. In February 2026, an activist investor (Bradley & Daytona Railway) filed a 13D with a 5% position in the preferreds.

The downside is limited by the Trust real assets (the perpetual rail lease with Norfolk Southern, the solar land in California) which generate ~$1.7M in recurring revenue and largely cover the non-recourse debt. The main risk remains the prolonged inaction of management or an American NYSE listing, but the asymmetric risk/return ratio at $3-4 justified the position. I liquidated my entire position at the beginning of the year when the stock quickly rose above $8, probably propelled by the activist 13D deposit. The thesis may not be complete if a tender offer materializes, but most of the asymmetric risk/reward has been captured.

$DOLE - Dole plc

David Murdock, the former owner who built Dole over four decades, passed away in June 2025 at age 102. In September, his estate entities (Castle & Cooke Holdings and The Murdock Group) liquidated their entire position ~12 million shares at $13.25 per share, roughly $158M. This block represented ~12.5% of the float dumped at once into an illiquid small-cap. The stock naturally broke below the offering price, reaching the $12.50–$13.55 range in October-November a purely technical dislocation with no fundamental deterioration in the business.

At $12.50–$13, the valuation was absurd for what Dole represents: a defensive cash generator with $8.5B in revenue, vertically integrated in bananas and pineapples, with a global brand. The stock traded below book value (~0.85x P/B), at ~6x EV/EBITDA, and offered an implied FCFE yield of 13–15% distressed valuation levels for a company actively deleveraging with an authorized $100M share buyback. The immediate catalyst: once the estate selling pressure was absorbed, the stock had no remaining natural overhang, and the corporate buyback provided a floor.

I sold my entire position during the month of February which had reached (from my point of view) ~11.50 P/E. This represents a fair price for 2026. I will continue to monitor the development and I could reinvest in it.

$AUUA.V - Aluula Composites Inc.

This is one of my favorite positions, with very big long-term potential. In January, I sold more than 95% of my position because the valuation had become excessive, just like for other positions. It was the only reason for my sale, otherwise I would have kept my position longer. Growth has remained impressive for 2 years, and gross-margins remain stable. I hope to be able to redeem at a lower valuation in the coming months/years.

$GUD.TO - Knight Therapeutic

It is important to note that Knight Therapeutic is not a company that develops drugs, but buys the rights in certain regions. It’s a serial drug acquirer who has already passed all the tests.

Knight Therapeutics entered 2024-2025 as a deeply undervalued pan-American specialty pharma platform trading below book value, with a proven management team that previously built Paladin Labs from a $1M market cap to a $3.2B takeout. The transformative catalyst came mid-2025 with the acquisition of Paladin Canadian assets for ~$127M a deal that reunited the two companies and immediately added over $70M in annual revenues, 40+ cash-flow-generating products, and critically, shifted Knight revenue mix toward higher-margin Canadian sales.

The key promoted portfolio (ex-acquisitions) was already compounding at a 20%+ three-year CAGR, and the Paladin/Sumitomo growth products (Xcopri, Orgovyx, Myfembree, Envarsus) accelerated 68% in H2 vs. H1 2025 per IQVIA. The news flow since the acquisition has been relentlessly positive. Knight executed 10 commercial launches in 2025 alone including Jornay PM in Canada, Minjuvi in Argentina and Mexico, and Pemazyre in Brazil and Mexico and expects at least 10 more in 2026. Jornay PM is particularly compelling: the first and only evening-dosed methylphenidate for pediatric ADHD in Canada, competing in a $1B+ market growing at a 10% CAGR. Wynzora (psoriasis) received Health Canada approval and launches in 2026. Crexont (Parkinson) has been submitted in Canada, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Peru. Meanwhile, the company returned six non-core Paladin products for $21.5M in cash, acquired a manufacturing facility in Argentina, and is actively buying back shares at $5-6/share.

The real inflection is the Canadian revenue ramp. Management explicitly guided that Canada will become one of Knight largest contributors to revenue and profitability within 2-3 years. This matters enormously for valuation: Canadian revenues carry higher gross margins, no hyperinflation distortion, no FX volatility, and trade at meaningfully higher multiples than Latin American pharma cash flows. FY2026 guidance of $490-510M in revenues with ~15% EBITDA margins came in 17% above consensus on EBITDA the market is still underestimating the operating leverage from the Canadian platform buildout. With a clean balance sheet ($95M cash, net debt/EBITDA near zero), an active NCIB, and a pipeline of 5+ products awaiting regulatory approval, Knight is transitioning from a LatAm-heavy story to a Canadian-led growth compounder at a discount to intrinsic value.

New during 2026-Q1 was QV Investors reaching +12%.

$DR.TO - Medical Facilities

I think I don’t need to present this stock which has already been very popular in 2024-2025. I had sold more than 75% of my position during the last Tender. And I had bought back a large position in 2025 between $14.50 and $15.50 which allowed us to have a very good yield and safety margin. With their recent announcement of the sale of 2 additional assets, the stock has risen to $18 and I took the opportunity to sell. My base case gives me a value of ~$18 and bull case at ~$20, but the IRR was too low for me.

In my opinion, the value of Medical Facilities is lower than that of several other investors, because I take into consideration several elements that decrease the total potential capital return. It is necessary to adjust the value by taking into account the bonuses and stock options of the management and board members. If they liquidate the company, they will have to pay primes/bonus. The legal fees associated with the sale and closure of the company, as well as taxes payable on the sale of assets (ASH & SFSH) and other miscellaneous expenses.

$TMV.DE / $TMVWY - TeamViewer

My first value and deleveraging type investment in Europe. Market cap is approximately €725M (~7x EV/NOAPT). Current EV/EBITDA at ~5x, an absurd level for a SaaS business with structural margins above 43%. Adjusted levered FCF for FY2025 was €208M, implying a ~29% FCF yield on equity at the current price.

The core thesis is mechanical deleveraging and resume buyback (2027). Net leverage stood at 2.6x at year-end 2025, down from 3.2x at the 1E acquisition close, with management targeting ~2.3x by year-end 2026 and below 2.0x thereafter. At ~€200M of annual FCF dedicated to debt reduction, net debt should fall to ~€775M by December 2026, bringing EV to ~€1.50B and LTM EV/EBITDA to ~4.5x. Every euro of debt repaid transfers value directly to equity holders with zero dilution. FY2026 guidance calls for 0–3% constant-currency revenue growth and an adjusted EBITDA margin of ~43%, meaning the cash generation engine is intact even with anemic topline. The base case requires no growth acceleration: leverage coming down and the multiple normalizing to even 7–8x would unlock 50–80% upside on the equity.

The primary risk is the ARR growth trajectory. Management cut ARR guidance by €35–40M at Q3 2025 due to underperformance in the 1E standalone business and FX headwinds, and FY2026 revenue guidance came in below consensus at €746–768M. If the legacy SMB base continues to erode and 1E integration fails to deliver, the market could maintain the discount indefinitely a classic value trap. However, enterprise ARR is growing 19% YoY in constant currency. The key catalyst is the Q1 2026 earnings release (May 6, 2026), which will confirm or deny the deleveraging trajectory and ARR stabilization. At these levels, downside is floored by FCF valuation, and the asymmetric risk/reward profile justifies a position.

$CSU.TO - Constellation Software Inc.

This also includes Topicus and Lumine.

Undoubtedly the most popular and well-known stock in my portfolio. I have nothing to add to what has already been said by hundreds of other investors. I have been an investor since 2022, but I sold when the valuation was too high for me in 2024. I bought back massively in 2026, when the valuation is about ~15x EV/NOPAT (NTM).

It has become one of my biggest positions and I continue to buy when the price drops below $2500.

$FDS - FactSet Research

I don’t think I have to present FacSet Research which is a very old company well known by investors in quality. But here is a small summary for people who do not know. FactSet is a dominant franchise in financial data and analytical solutions, serving over 9,100 institutional clients with an ASV retention rate above 95%. The subscription-based business model provides exceptional revenue visibility: organic ASV reached $2.45B in Q2 fiscal 2026, accelerating to +6.7% YoY. This is a highly recurring business, deeply embedded in the critical workflows of its buy-side, sell-side, and wealth management clients.

The appointment of a Chief AI Officer (Kate Stepp), the launch of “FactSet AI for Banking” in partnership with Finster AI, and the integration of tools like AI Doc Ingest for Cobalt position the company to monetize AI directly within its existing workflows rather than being disrupted by it. CFO Helen Shan highlighted that AI is already contributing to new client acquisition and operational efficiencies. Meanwhile, the compression in adjusted margins (35.0% vs 37.3% last year) reflects deliberate investments in technology and talent an acceptable cost if the acceleration in organic growth is sustained.

At an entry price of approximately $190-200, the position was initiated at ~11x EV/EBIT a historically depressed valuation with this quality of recurring revenue. The active buyback program ($163M in Q2 alone, $697M remaining authorized, at an average price paid of $250) provides a floor of support. The primary risk remains continued margin compression if AI investments fail to translate into sustained ASV acceleration, but the risk/reward at this valuation level remains asymmetrically skewed to the long side.

$DBO.TO - D-BOX Technologies Inc.

I don’t think I have to present D-BOX already very well known, otherwise you can read the analysis of Sohra Peak Capital (https://sohrapeakcapital.com/research/). This stock buzz in December 2025 and I took the opportunity to sell my entire position at almost $1 (~20x P/E). From my point of view, the price had become too expensive too quickly. But the price fell back quickly and created a good opportunity (~11x P/E NTM) to buy back my position.

$FBF.V - Fab-Form Industries Ltd.

It’s a Canadian manufacturer of HDPE fabric formwork for concrete, holding proprietary patents (Fastfoot, Fast-Tube, Monopour) that replace traditional lumber in residential construction. The business is high quality: revenue compounding at ~25% CAGR over 7 years, EBIT margins of 15%+, zero debt, over $5M in cash on the balance sheet, and a founder-operator (Fearn family, ~44% ownership) aligned with minority shareholders. At recent prices, EV/EBIT was around 8x, P/FCF at 9x, and FCF yield on EV at ~19% value multiples for a profitable company with defensible IP, a pipeline of new products, growth across western Canadian cities, and upcoming U.S. expansion. This was a small position for me at a fairly reasonable valuation.

Earlier this year, for unknown reasons, the stock spiked above $2.80 intraday and I opportunistically sold over 70% of my position. Shortly after, management announced the purchase of a residential lot in White Rock, B.C. for $2.45M more than half of available cash supposedly to demonstrate innovative construction methods. In my view, this is a poor capital allocation decision: it shifts the company from a capital-light formwork manufacturer toward quasi-real estate development, with no capital return to shareholders despite years of cash accumulation. I sold the remainder of my position at cost (~$1.20). The stock has since fallen below $1.00, validating the exit. I’ll be monitoring this over the coming years the underlying business remains good and I’d gladly re-enter if management returns to disciplined capital allocation, if the land is sold, or if the price drops.

$ROK.V - ROK Resources Inc.

I have already talked about this special situation in another Substack post. It was an arbitrage that went wrong. I advise you to read my previous post.

Since the war in Iran and the rise in oil prices, ROK has recovered rapidly. Let’s not forget that it had received offers from 3 interested parties, this will be interesting to follow for a second arbitration.

$KSI.TO - kneat.com, inc.

It is one of my favorite companies in micro-caps, after several years of valuation too high for me and also a negative EBITDA. I had the opportunity to build a small position that I had set up during the SaaS crash at the end of 2025. Kneat is the leader in digitalization of validation processes in life sciences, a niche where FDA compliance makes supplier replacement almost unthinkable once implemented. The ‘Land and Expand’ model is extremely effective: Kneat enters through one site, then spreads to other factories and processes at the same client, which generates a NRR greater than 150%. The top 20 pharma worldwide are already clients, and the TAM remains largely underpenetrated. Kneat has just crossed the inflection point towards ARR profitability.

However, I liquidated my position for a slight profit at the beginning of 2026. My convictions have eroded. First, the growth trajectory seems slower than my initial thesis. The pace of acquiring new logos and the speed of intra-client expansion do not seem to accelerate at the rate necessary to justify a premium SaaS multiple. Then, and above all, the competitive threat from Veeva Systems proves to be more serious than I initially estimated. I recommend you read all the interviews on Tegus about Kneat if you are interested in understanding the risk. (Also on Veeva and ValGenesis)

I don’t want to go into more details. To summarize, I love Kneat, but the risks that I identify made me sell at an evaluation of +20x EV/EBITDA. I continue to monitor the situation because I want, if the opportunity arises, to buy back my position at a valuation that provides me to have a safety margin.

$LIS.V - Lithium South Development Corporation

A simple arbitrage on a lithium mine in Argentina, the spread was rather large caused by several risks. On March 31, they “Announces Closing Date of April 7, 2026” and the upcoming payment in April of $0.505 per share. With some research and buying under $0.42 risks adjusting this, it’s was an EV+ arbitrage. I sold 80% of my position at $0.50.

$BEKB.TO - The Becker Milk Company Limited

This is a mini-position for me. Nothing new, except bad news about one of their lands that cannot be sold and its value is almost zero. You can read more in a previous post.

Becker Milk Company - microcap, profitable and asset sales (liquidation) at 0.70x P/TBV

$ELL.V - Everybody Loves Languages Corp.

Another arbitrage on 3$mm market cap with a spread of 6-13% for several weeks, which gives us an IRR of 30-65% (avg at 50%). The offer is very low, and we had an opportunity to have an increase in the redemption price by the management in place. But shareholders voted yes to the current price of $0.85 per share. By the end of April, payment should be finalized.

$CDB.V - Cordoba Minerals Corp.

A special situation of arbitrage regarding the potential return of capital following the sale of a copper mine in Colombia. It took me a lot of research to fully understand the risk. The spread was huge for many good reasons. I bought at the end of 2025 and sold at the beginning of 2026 due to regulatory risks that he was unable to pass. The sale of the mine had a clause on the approval of the mining project, with a deadline of December 30, 2025. After monitoring the development, I noticed a radical increase in risks at the beginning of 2026, which prompted my exit. But following the buyer announcement to waive the project approval clause, it made me buy back my position. And the payment was made during March 2026.

This (Cordoba) type of arbitrage could be used to explain the concept of ‘Expcted Value’ in special situations or in any kind of investment. In my opinion, the risk was increasing and the arbitration was no longer EV+. Until it removed the approval clause. I strongly recommend you to learn this easy but very useful concept in the world of investment but also in everyday life.

$MCMA.V & MCS.V - Matachewan Consolidated Mines & McChip Resources Inc.

Special situation of liquidation type and return of capital. McChip and Matachewan are very linked with the same CEO. For some time, the 2 companies have been in liquidation mode. In September 2025 they announced a future distribution of approximately $0.91. Matachewan made the same announcement in September and the payment for Matachewan was made in January 2026 ($0.40 cash and 0.7780 Taranis share). The price has quickly risen and the arbitrage on MCS/MCMA is no longer attractive at the current price.

For your information, McChip is a shareholder of Matachewan and you will be able to see the cash increase on the balance sheet.

$SBAR - Sabre Corporation

This is a deleveraging type investment. I had bought before the announcement of Constellation and the ensuing buzz. My purchase price was about $1 based on an assessment that by the end of 2026 at a multiple of 8x EV/EBITDA we would have had a price ~$1.90 and a bull-case at 9x for the end of 2027 at +$3.50. I sold my entire position during the big buzz around Constellation when the price almost crossed $2. I will surely buy back my position if the price drops below $1.20, which allows me to have a good safety margin as well. Constellation is on the board.

I don’t go into details because since the announcement of Constellation, there are several investors who have published writeups or summaries. (check Twitter or Substack)

Snapshot base on EBITDA

$MTY.TO - MTY Food Group Inc.

Special situation of arbitration type. MTY has been in the process of a strategic review since November 2025, initiated in a context where the founder Stanley Ma (79 years old, 13.6% of the capital) is probably looking for a definitive exit after having already sold shares at C$54-63 in 2023. The stock is trading at ~7x EBITDA, a 10-year low that does not reflect the operational stability of the company, same-store sales declined only ~2% and profitability has remained flat. Detailed rumors (Radio Tandil, January 2026) report at least three bidders in advanced discussions, including Serruya Private Equity (former owner of Kahala/Cold Stone, resold to MTY in 2016) and Recipe Unlimited (Fairfax), with a high offer at C$60/share or ~8,5x EBITDA TTM a consistent multiple with comparable transactions in the sector.

The risk/reward asymmetry is attractive: at $60, the upside is +50%, while the downside in case of process failure is limited to ~10% towards pre-announcement levels. The wave of M&A in the sector (Del Taco, Denny, Potbelly, The Keg, Dave Hot Chicken all acquired in 2025) confirms the appetite of buyers for low-price franchisors, and the profile of MTY strong generation of FCF, asset-franchise light, diversified brands make it a natural target. The process has been ongoing for 4-5 months and an announcement could occur by Q2 2026.

$MNRO - Monro, Inc.

This is a special situation of the type Activism + Potential Buyout. Monro operate ~1,100 auto service centers whose stock is trading at depressed levels (~5× normalized EBITDA of ~$100M) after two years of operational underperformance. The AlixPartners-led turnaround closure of 145 unprofitable stores, $28M inventory reduction, $23M in real estate monetization is beginning to bear fruit with three consecutive quarters of positive comparable store sales. The central catalyst is the imminent conversion of Peter Solomon super-voting shares (expected June–August 2026), which removes the last structural barrier to a change of control. The new CEO, Fitzsimmons, left a 30-year partnership at AlixPartners for a package massively aligned with a sale: 265,000 shares vesting at $25–$30/share with automatic acceleration upon a change of control, plus a $1.8M cash golden parachute.

Two top-tier activists are already aggressively positioned: Carl Icahn holds 16.9% (purchased at $15–$17+) and explicitly signaled strategic interest on $IEP earnings call, referencing a $1.2B war chest and the ability to tender for entire businesses a playbook identical to his 2015 Pep Boys acquisition, where Gabelli was also involved. Gabelli, for his part, has increased his stake from 5% to 9.4%, buying at $18–$23/share, well above the current price. At $25/share (~8× normalized EBITDA), the stock remains significantly discounted versus peers (Valvoline at ~13×, Driven Brands at ~9×), providing a comfortable margin of safety even absent a transaction. The primary risk is a turnaround failure or a delay in catalyst activation, but the convergence of governance reform + activism + management alignment makes this an asymmetrically favorable setup over the year.

$ROOT.TO - Roots Corporation

Another special situation ‘Strategic Review’ announced on March 3, 2026. We could already speculate in 2025 that it would be for sale. The main catalyst is the willingness of Searchlight Capital Partners (~52% of shares) to monetize its position in a poorly liquid asset. At ~3.50, the security is trading at approximately 6.5x (pre-IFRS 16) TTM adjusted EBITDA of $23.5 million, a significant discount compared to comparable lifestyle/fashion brand transactions (avg of 7-10x, Canada Goose PE bid at ~8x). Even applying a conservative output multiple of 7.5x justified by small size, Canadian concentration and modest margins (-9%) results in an implied price of about $4.30. At 8x, the price rises to ~$4.60, an upside of 22% to 32% over a horizon of ~9-12 months, for an annualized IRR of +30%.

The main risk is no deal: Searchlight controls the board and might accept a low price for liquidity, or the process might yield nothing, bringing the title back to the pre-announcement $2.50-3.00. Mitigating factors include a reasonable balance sheet (normalized leverage < 0.4x at year-end), a visible operational turnaround (comp sales positive since Q3 2024, GM ~60%), an active NCIB, and a 50+ year heritage brand with ~100 stores and real brand equity.

Other Positions

I have other positions that I have in my portfolio or sold during the last 3 months that I prefer not to disclose at the moment. Maybe I will do it in a next edition.

---

Short

I had started to allocate 5% of my portfolio in a few Short positions in 2025. And during 2026 I allocating 5 to 25% of my portfolio. These were short-term positions (few weeks). I do not aspire for now to have a long-term Long/Short portfolio, but the current market in the US and Canada gives us several good opportunities. My performance of these positions was the best in 2026 but my short positions are taxed at 45%, which drastically reduces my performance.

Short basket:

• $DFH

• $MTH

• $CVNA

• $FLWS

• Silver

• $PLTR

• $HIMS

• $KBH

• $GSY.TO

• $QQQ PUT option 2027

• Some other good shorts that I prefer not to talk about publicly

I will not go into the details of each Short position, I believe that if you spend only 10 mins on each position you quickly understand the reasons.

It’s been a good quarter that has asked me a lot of work, with a new strategy (Short) and all the noise caused by the war in Iran. I hope for a calmer 2nd quarter, with better focus on good opportunities in micro-caps. For the moment, I can’t find new ideas that deserve an immediate purchase.

This was my first time speaking publicly about several of my positions. It took me a lot of effort and time to write everything down. I don’t know if I will continue to do so. It’s a test. Feel free to share your comments or investment ideas with me.

Max

---

Disclaimer: This newsletter is published for informational and educational purposes only. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any security or financial instrument. The author is not registered as an investment advisor, portfolio manager, or dealing representative with the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or any other securities regulatory authority in any jurisdiction. The author is an individual investor expressing personal opinions and sharing personal investment decisions. The author holds long and/or short positions in many of the securities discussed in this newsletter and may buy, sell, or modify these positions at any time without prior notice. The information presented is based on publicly available sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty is made as to its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing in micro-cap, small-cap, and special situations securities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of the entire investment. Readers should perform their own independent research and consult with a licensed financial professional before making any investment decisions.